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Abstract. One of the new avenues in the study of political corruption is that of neo-institutional
economics, of which the principal-agent theory is a part. In this article a principal-agent model
of corruption is presented, in which there are two principals (one of which is corrupting), and
one agent (who is corrupted). The behaviour of these principals and agent is analysed in terms
of the costs and benefits associated with different actions. The model is applied to political
corruption in representative democracies, showing that, contrary to common belief, the use of
principal-agent models is not limited to bureaucratic corruption.
Introduction: Neo-institutional economics and corruption
Although corruption is generally analysed as a social phenomenon, especially
in comparative research, it is from the decisions of individuals that corruption
stems. In this article a principal-agent model of corruption is presented, one
which focuses on these decisions. Our choice of individualism is a method-
ological one, and must not be understood as a denial of the significance of
the social structures of which individuals are a part. Indeed, neo-institutional
economics, of which the principal-agent literature is a part, deals explicitly
with the institutional factors that affect the decisions of individuals. What can
neo-institutional economics contribute to our understanding of corruption?
To answer that question let us first give a brief overview of neo-institutional
economics in general.1
Institutions can be defined as collectively binding working rules.2 A con-
tract between two persons is such a set of rules, as are school regulations.
Proportional representation is an institution, just as the stock market and mar-
riage are. Institutions are distinguished from the preferences of individuals;
they structure and constrain the decisions made by them. These institutional
constraints are emphasised in various ways, leading to three different, but
related branches within the field of neo-institutional economics: the property
rights branch, the transaction costs branch, and the principal-agent branch.3
In the property rights literature decisions by individuals concerning goods
are assumed to be affected not so much by the goods themselves, but by the
kind of property rights individuals can exercise. These property rights can be
user rights, usufructuary rights and transfer rights. An individual who owns
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a house will make different decisions about maintenance than an individual
who is a tenant. In the property rights literature institutions constitute property
rights of individuals, as well as the means for these individuals to defend
themselves against infringements of these rights.
Stemming from the work of Coase, the transaction costs branch empha-
sises the importance of transaction costs for the allocation of resources and
the structure of economic organization.4 Prior to Coase, the role of transac-
tion costs was minimal since such costs are for the greater part information
costs, and most economic theories and models assumed full information.
Following Williamson, transaction costs can be divided into ex ante and ex
post costs. Ex ante costs are the costs of drafting, negotiating and safeguard-
ing an agreement.5 The costs of monitoring and controlling the execution of
an agreement are ex post costs, as are possible revision costs. Transaction
costs will differ depending on the incidence of the transactions, the degree
of uncertainty that the individuals face, and the “asset specificity”, e.g. the
extent to which the good and the transaction concerned are geared to one
another. It should be mentioned that what Williamson calls an “agreement”
must be understood to include not only contracts, but other more extensive
institutions as well.
In the principal-agent branch of neo-institutional economics (or: agency
theory) elements of both the property rights theory and the transaction costs
theory are integrated and used to model relationships between principals and
agents. Principal-agent models assume that the interests of principal and agent
diverge, that there is informational asymmetry to the advantage of the agent,
but that the principal can prescribe the pay-off rules in their relationship.
Furthermore, an important feature of the agency literature is that decisions
are considered to be trade-offs between different kinds of costs (monitoring
costs, bonding costs and residual loss).
What contribution has neo-institutional economics made, to date, to the
study of corruption? The most comprehensive economic models of corrup-
tion are those of Rose-Ackerman, Lui, Andvig and Moene, Klitgaard, and
Alam.6 Rose-Ackerman focuses on a traditional form of corruption, namely,
bribery of bureaucrats by companies in the government contracting process.7
The incidence of corruption is found to differ according to the degree of com-
petition and the extent to which government has well-defined preferences for
the good in question. Her analysis pinpoints the areas in which resources
for anti-corruption measures can best be used. In later work, she extends her
analysis to other types of corruption, namely, high-level political corruption
as well as low-level bureaucratic corruption.8 Lui assumes that corruption is
more difficult to detect and deter when a greater proportion of the officials is
corrupt.9 Using a two-period model with overlapping generations of officials,
A PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL OF CORRUPTION 209
Lui shows that there can be several stationary equilibrium levels of corruption
in an economy. Andvig and Moene offer a fine model of bureaucratic corrup-
tion, focusing on the demand as well as the supply side.10 Their model also
has multiple equilibria, which sheds light on the varying incidence of corrup-
tion across similar societies and activities. Klitgaard offers a largely heuristic
principal-agent model, which encompasses a principal, a corrupt agent, and
a client.11 He offers an overview of various measures to fight corruption as
well. Alam explains variations in corruption across agencies and societies by
the ability of the victims of corruption to engage in countervailing actions.12
These countervailing actions can be evasive, direct or illicit. The incentives
to engage in countervailing activities depend on two kinds of factors, global
factors and specific factors. Global factors like property rights explain vari-
ation across societies; specific factors such as the type of corruption explain
variation across agencies.
Elements of neo-institutional economics have been used by Bakker and
Schulte Nordholt, to elucidate the mechanisms by which corruption can take
root in societies, especially when societies are going through institutional
turnovers.13 Similar findings have been put forward by Johnson and Hunt-
ington, with regard to institutional discrepancies within a society.14 To the
possibility of such a horizontal institutional gap, Bakker and Schulte Nordholt
add the possibility of a vertical institutional gap, which arises when nation-
al economic, political and legal institutions are not equipped to deal with
internationalization.
Other authors have combined neo-institutional economics with game the-
ory. Manion analyses bribery in Chinese enterprise licencing, assuming that
those who offer the bribes are fully entitled to their licenses and do not know
whether the bribes are overpayments or fees for valued illicit services.15
Bribery can be shown to be an equilibrium solution in such an asymmetric
information game. A similar analysis is that of Cadot who focuses on the
situation in which an applicant has to pass a test in order to get a permit.16
Different solutions exist for this game, depending on the information sets of
both players. Basu, Bhattacharya and Mishra, using game theory as well as
the economic theory of crime, based on the work of Becker, offer a simple
model of recursive corruption.17 Recursive corruption occurs when a corrupt
official gets caught and bribes the official that caught him. Related work is that
of Mookherjee and Png who analyse the delegation of enforcement authority
in environmental policy, and the opportunities such delegation brings about
for corruption.18
Focusing on political corruption, Rasmusen and Ramseyer have com-
bined game theory with the theory of “rent-seeking”, which is related to
neo-institutional economics.19 They note that the size of bribes in political
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corruption is small, and put that down to the imperfect coordination between
legislators. When a legislator expects other legislators to sell their votes, and
there is no coordination, he will take whatever bribe is offered. Because this
is hardly satisfactory, legislators may opt for a ban on bribery. Myerson uses
game theory to analyse the effectiveness of different electoral systems in
reducing corruption in a multiparty system.20 Galeotti and Merlo, who also
investigate the relationship between electoral rules and government corrup-
tion, have challenged Myerson’s conclusion that proportional representation
guarantees the exclusion from government of corrupt parties.21
Looking at the contributions from neo-institutional economics we find that,
apart from Klitgaard, and to some extent Rose-Ackerman, the principal-agent
theory has not been fully used to enhance our understanding of corruption.
This article aims to fill that gap, and to do so in two ways. First, unlike
Klitgaard and Rose-Ackerman, who assume only one principal-agent relation
namely the relation between a corrupt official and his superior, we will look
upon the relation between the “client” and the corrupt official as a principal-
agent relation as well. Second, the notion of trading-off different costs is taken
into account more explicitly.
Johnston remarks that while the principal-agent approach is well-suited
to the analysis of bureaucratic corruption, other more broadly-based forms
of corruption may fit the framework awkwardly or not at all.22 Moreover,
he seems to suggest that the application of the principal-agent approach to
corruption, because of its supposed bias towards bureaucratic corruption,
takes politics out of our notion of corruption. In this article we will put this
proposition to the test by applying the principal-agent framework to political
corruption in representative democracies.
In the next section, a basic principal-agent model will be introduced. This
basic model demonstrates how non-co-operative behaviour by an agent can
occur, and which factors, in terms of different costs, condition such behaviour.
In the third section the basic model will be modified. First of all, an appropriate
definition of corruption is selected. In this article corruption is defined as any
unauthorized transaction between agents and a third party. In the case of
bureaucratic corruption the agents are bureaucrats, and the principals are
elected or appointed officials. In the case of political corruption the latter are
the agents, and the principals are the voters. The third party is considered to
be a second principal to the agent. Given our definition of corruption the basic
principal-agent model is amended and turned into a principals-agent model
of corruption. In the fourth section this model is applied in a tentative way to
political corruption.The fifth section, finally, contains some conclusions.
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Modelling principal-agent relations
A basic principal-agent model
Let P be a principal, and A an agent. Assume that A can choose between two
alternative actions x and y, and that these actions contribute to the realization
of two different outcomes, X and Y. In choosing between different actions
A is supposed to represent P’s interests in return for payment of some kind.
Assume that P is unable – costlessly – to observe A’s actions, so that P has
only the outcomes by which to assess and to reward A’s behaviour. If these
outcomes were fully determined by A’s actions, P could base his rewarding
scheme on these outcomes, and the lack of information about A’s actions
would not be relevant. The outcomes, however, are not determined by A’s
actions, they are only affected by them.
Assume that P’s interests do not match A’s interests, as can be shown by
their utility functions, which have different arguments:
UP = U(a; b; c) (1.1)
UA = U(d; e; f) (1.2)
Assume also that P wants to maximise his own welfare, and that the utili-
ties associated with the two possible outcomes X and Y are U
P
X and U
P
Y
.
Suppose that U
P
X
> U
P
Y
, so that P will prefer outcome X. If U
A
x and
U
A
y are the utilities for A that are involved with the possible actions x and y,
and if we assume welfare-maximisation by A, A will choose action x if U
A
x
>U
A
y
, and action y if U
A
x
<U
A
y
. Now there are four different possibilities:
1. the actual outcome is Y and the action chosen by A was y;
2. the actual outcome is Y, despite the fact that the action chosen by A
was x;
3. the actual outcome is X, and the action chosen by A was x;
4. the actual outcome is X, despite the fact that the action chosen by A
was y.
P is not able to distinguish between the first and the second possibility, nor
between the third and the fourth. Confronted with an actual outcome Y and the
welfare loss associated with that outcome, there are three different measures
that P can take.
First, he can use incentives. These incentives change the characteristics of
one or more of the actions A can choose from. For example, P could change
the original alternative x into a more attractive alternative x+, hoping that
U
A
x+
> U
A
y
, in which case A will choose x+. Of course, P could also
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turn y into a less attractive alternative, y-, hoping that U
A
x
> U
A
y 
. This
use of incentives or disincentives can be seen as a refinement of the original
rewarding scheme. Note that the use of these positive and negative incentives
does not change A’s utility function in any way. Note also that this use of
incentives, and the intended revision of A’s choice, does not guarantee that
the actual outcome will be X.
Second, P can use persuasion. The difference between this measure and the
use of incentives, is that A’s utility function is meant to converge, from U
A
to
U
A
, in the direction of U
P
. A possible new utility function for A is then:
U
A
= U(a; b; e; f) (1.3)
which resembles (1.1) more than did (1.2). If U
A
x
> U
A
y
, A will choose
action x, which makes outcome X, preferred by P, more likely.
Third, assuming an hierarchical relationship between P and A, P, as A’s
superior, can use directives, thus reducing the discretion A has. Supposing
there are only two alternative actions, x and y, which A can take, the use of
directives would mean that one action is prescribed (x) and the other (y) is
not allowed.23 This increases the probability that the appropriate action (i.e.
x) is chosen, but P can never be sure of that.
More in general, the use of directives is aimed at reducing the set of
alternative actions for A, whereas the use of incentives can be seen as changing
the characteristics of the alternatives, and the use of persuasion as changing
the criteria by which the alternatives are assessed.
As mentioned before, without any monitoring, P has only the outcomes X
and Y to evaluate A’s behaviour. The use of measures controlling that behav-
iour requires more information on P’s part. Thus, there are two different costs
for P associated with monitoring and controlling A’s behaviour: inspection
costs (or: appraisal costs) and prevention costs.24
What if the actual outcome is X? Can P rest for a while? No, there is still
the possibility that A has been non-co-operative by choosing action y (the
fourth possibility), although he has been paid by P to act in P’s interests. Even
though P does not suffer a direct welfare loss as a result of a non-preferred
outcome, there is the possibility that he has been wasting money. To prevent
that state of affairs P will use the same measures as when Y is the actual
outcome. So either way P will incur inspection and prevention costs.
Is there any reason for A to react to all this monitoring and controlling by
P? First, suppose A’s original choice was y.
When P uses a negative incentive, the choice A had between x and y
becomes a choice between x and y-. If U
A
y
> U
A
x
> U
A
y  the welfare loss
for A associated with this negative incentive is U
A
y
-U
A
x
. However, when P
uses a positive incentive, the choice A had between x and y becomes a choice
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between x+ and y, and, supposing U
A
x+
> U
A
y
> U
A
x
, A’s welfare will
increase from U
A
y to U
A
x+
.
When P uses persuasion it is not clear whether A is worse off or not. First
A chose y because U
A
y
> U
A
x; now he chooses x because U
A
x
> U
A
y
. A’s
utility level U
A
x cannot meaningfully be compared with his utility level U
A
y
,
because utility functions U
A
and U
A
differ.
When P uses directives, A’s welfare loss is the same as when P uses a
negative incentive: U
A
y
-U
A
x
.
Now, suppose A was already co-operative; his original action was x. He
will welcome the use of positive incentives, because U
A
x+
>U
A
x
. He will be
indifferent to the use of negative incentives, because they affect an alternative
he did not choose in the first place.
The use of persuasion could mean a welfare improvement if U
A
x
> U
A
x
,
but then we would be comparing apples and oranges.
He will be indifferent to the use of directives, finally, unless his discretion
as such represents a utility to him, in which case his welfare will decrease.
On the whole, the best thing for A to do is to conceal his actions in order
to frustrate P’s monitoring, and at the same time to try to avoid negative
incentives and directives as well as to try to lure P into the use of positive
incentives. That strategy is recommendable irrespective of whether A is co-
operative or not. However, if A is already co-operative, he can use that fact to
conciliate P. Opposed to P’s inspection costs and prevention costs, there are
A’s concealment costs and diversion costs.
Comparison with the prevailing principal-agent model
The principal-agent model that is presented above differs fundamentally from
the model that prevails in the agency literature, although the assumptions are
the same: there is divergence of interests between principal and agent, the
actions of the agent do not fully determine the outcomes, and the principal
cannot costlessly monitor these actions.
In the prevailing model the principal is thought to engage in “monitoring”,
which covers a variety of activities,25 and the agent is sometimes expected
to “bond”, e.g. the agent is expected to expend resources to guarantee his
principal that he will not take actions that will harm him.26 The agency-
problem is then to minimise the agency costs, which are the sum of:
– the monitoring expenditures incurred by the principal;
– the bonding expenditures incurred by the agent;
– the residual loss, e.g. the resulting welfare loss for the principal, given a
certain amount of monitoring and bonding.
The main weakness of this model is that it lumps together disutilities of
different individuals. The monitoring costs and the residual loss are disutilities
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of the principal. The bonding costs, however, are borne by the agent. It
is sometimes argued that the bonding costs are disutilities of the principal
because it is likely that the agent meets the bonding expenditures using the
payment he gets from the principal in return for looking after the principal’s
interests. However, whether the agent uses these resources, or he uses other
resources to pay for these bonding expenditures, is not relevant: they are a
disutility of the agent.
A related criticism is that it is unclear whom the “agency problem” con-
cerns: the principal or the agent? Much of the earlier agency literature focused
on the normative aspects of the principal-agent relation, from the angle of the
principal. That literature showed how to structure the principal-agent relation
in order for the agent to make choices that will maximize the principal’s
welfare given the existence of uncertainty and imperfect monitoring.27 The
subsequent positive agency literature has not lived down that original imbal-
ance, which emerges when we want to explain the agent’s behaviour. Whereas
the principal is supposed to minimise the sum of his monitoring costs and
his residual loss, the model does not offer such a trade-off for the agent. Is
the agent only to minimise his bonding costs? Why would he bond in the
first place? Bonding can only be understood as a means, among other things,
of diversion by an agent who is facing the possibility of a welfare loss as
a consequence of the controlling activities of his principal. That is why we
have, in our basic principal-agent model, two well-matched opponents, who
are frustrating each other’s plans, by inspecting and camouflaging, by control-
ling and diverting. One of these individuals, the principal, has the advantage
that he can prescribe the pay-off rules, and that (supposing he is the agent’s
superior) he can use directives to control the agent. For his part, the agent can
take advantage of the fact that the principal is faced with a lack of information
about the agent’s actions and with uncertainty about the link between these
actions and the outcomes.
That in our model principal and agent are equally matched is no repudiation
of the possible hierarchical character of the relationship between principal and
agent, as is shown by the possibility that the principal, as the agent’s superior,
uses directives to curb the agent’s behaviour. Neither are we of the opinion
that a hierarchy has to exist between principal and agent, in order to label their
relationship a principal-agent relation. The question whether a hierarchy is
essential for an agency relationship or not, is often confused with the question
whether there is any delegation of decision-making authority.28 In our view
delegation refers to alleviating one’s duties by letting others make choices
for you and take actions on your behalf. Delegation refers to tasks that could
well have been performed by the principal, were it not for lack of time. Just
as hierarchy, delegation is not essential for agency relationships. If a car
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Figure 1. Inspection costs, prevention costs and failure costs.
is brought to a garage for an overhaul, the car-owner becomes a principal
and the garagist an agent, even though neither are part of some hierarchical
organization, and even though there is no delegation of authority. What is
essential for an agency relationship is discretion of the agent. This discretion
follows from the informational asymmetry in the relation between principal
and agent,29 and not from the delegation of authority.30
Trading-off different costs
Turning back to our basic model, P has to bear three different costs:
– inspection costs, I
P
;
– prevention costs, P
P
;
– failure costs, F
P
. These are the costs associated with the welfare-loss P
eventually suffers (his “residual loss”).
The inspection and prevention costs will vary with the amount of inspecting
and preventing that takes place, as will the failure costs, as is shown in
Figure 1. The total costs are the sum of inspection and prevention costs on
the one hand, and failure costs on the other.31 P aims at minimizing his total
costs, TC
P
.
A also has to bear three different costs:
– concealment costs, C
A
;
– diversion costs, D
A
;
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– failure costs, F
A
. This is the “residual loss” A eventually suffers, com-
pared to the situation in which A could have it his own way, without any
monitoring and controlling by P.
Just like P, A will want to minimise his total costs (TC
A
), which are the sum
of his concealment, diversion, and failure costs.32
The course of the F
P
-curve in Figure 1 is affected by the amount of con-
cealment and diversion by A. If there is much concealment and diversion, P’s
inspection and prevention will be less effective than if there is only a little
concealment and diversion. The effectiveness of P’s activities is reflected in
his failure costs. The less effective his activities are, the higher his failure
costs. Suppose A increases his concealment and diversion activities, resulting
in a shift upwards of the F
P
-curve and thus of the TC
P
-curve. With increas-
ing concealment and diversion, new optima for P are brought about, at higher
total costs, and at a higher level of inspection and prevention. Of course, the
increased level of inspection and prevention makes A less successful in his
activities to reduce his residual loss, shifting up the F
A
- and TC
A
-curves, with
optima at increased levels of concealment and diversion. These increased lev-
els of concealment and diversion make P’s activities less effective, shift up the
F
P
- and TC
P
-curves, and increase the level of inspection and prevention, thus
making A’s concealment and diversion less successful etc. What is striking is
that P and A, as a result of each others’ activities, are pushed towards these
high levels of inspection, prevention, concealment and diversion.
This problem is similar to that of a duopoly, and whether it is solved or
not depends on additional assumptions being made about the behavior of P
and A. If P is passive he chooses an as his optimal amount of inspection
and prevention, regardless of the indirect effect that level of inspection and
prevention has on his own failure costs. If A is also passive (the Cournot-type
of duopoly), he will also make an independent choice concerning his optimal
amount of concealment and diversion. If A is not passive (the Stackelberg-
type of duopoly) a solution exists as long as P remains passive. If neither are
passive, i.e. both P and A react to each other’s decisions (the indeterminate
type of duopoly), then they are on the road to high levels of their activities, and
high total costs. Just as in the case of a collective monopoly, it is imaginable
that some kind of collusion takes place, in which P and A bury the hatchet,
and arrangements are made that minimize the sum of P’s total costs and A’s
total costs.
Apart from choosing the optimal amount of inspection and prevention giv-
en the F
P
- and I
P
+P
P
-curves, and given the level of A’s activities, P can
try to shift these curves downwards. Shifting downwards the I
P
+P
P
-curve
is equivalent to raising the cost-efficiency of his monitoring and controlling
activities. To get the F
P
-curve downward, P can choose more effective mon-
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itoring and controlling activities. But even if P can persuade A to prefer the
same outcome as he does himself, even if there is no divergence of interests
between P and A whatsoever, there will still be failure costs for P, because
the outcomes are not fully determined by A’s actions. And even if there is no
monitoring and controlling problem at all, that is to say if P can costlessly
monitor and control A’s actions, these failure costs will arise, for the same
reason.
Ultimately then, P will have to turn his mind to the problem of indetermi-
nacy of the outcomes. The more vaguely and abstractly P has defined these
outcomes, the less likely it is that A’s actions will determine them. And the
more agents are involved with the same outcomes, the less likely it is that one
agent’s actions will be determining.
Corruption as a principal-agent problem
A definition of corruption
There are almost as many different definitions of corruption as there are
contributions to the research on the phenomenon. Surveys and discussions can
be found in Johnston, Holmes, Hoetjes, and Heidenheimer.33 The aim of this
article is definitely not to conjure up a new definition of corruption. However,
in order to present an adequate principal-agent model of corruption, we need
an adequate definition of corruption. A concise definition, and therefore a
good starting-point, is that of Bayley, who defines corruption as the misuse of
authority, as a result of considerations of personal gain.34 There are several
elements of this definition that are worth discussing.
First, there is the element of considerations of personal gain. In economics
the behaviour of an individual is assumed to be brought about by his looking
after his own interests. What these interests are is for the individual to decide;
he can be a materialist or an idealist, an egoist or an altruist, a crook or a
saint, or (like most people) a little bit of all of these. From the point of view
of (neo-institutional) economics the element of personal gain in a definition
of corruption is a superfluous one. This is more important than it may seem
at first glance. If for example, a bureaucrat accepts a bribe from a company,
and in return grants a license to that company, we unmistakably have a case
of corruption. Now what if the company does not offer a bribe but offers a job
to the bureaucrat’s brother? And what if the bureaucrat turns down a bribe,
but instead wants the company to donate to the campaign of his favourite
politician, or to Greenpeace? If any of these favours in return are able to bring
about a misuse of authority, they apparently signify an increase in welfare
for the corrupt bureaucrat. There is no need for us to go into the nature of
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these favours, as we have to if we confine ourselves to “personal gain” as the
bureaucrat’s motive.
Second, there is the element of misuse of authority. As was discussed above,
it is best to swap “authority” for “discretion”, which leaves us with “misuse
of discretion”. What differentiates non-cooperative behaviour in general, as
pictured in our basic principal-agent model, from corruption? Not the fact
that the corrupt agent acts contrary to his principal’s interests, in choosing
an action that the principal would not have chosen. Is it the nature of the
action itself then? If an agent chooses an action which not only his principal
would not give preference to, but which is unauthorized or illegal as well,
then we have to do with fraud. Corruption differs from fraud, however, in two
ways. In the first place, corruption in itself does not necessarily involve an
unauthorized or illegal action by the agent. There is nothing illegal in granting
a license to a company, nor is it unauthorized to do so for the bureaucrat
involved. Fraud, however, is always about illicit actions. In the second place,
corruption always involves a third party, whereas fraud is committed by a
single person. It is this involvement with an accomplice that is essential for
corruption. In other words, it is the unauthorized dealing with a third party
that distinguishes corruption from non-co-operative behaviour in general, as
well as from simple fraud. The granting of a licence (the agent’s action) may
be authorized, taking a bribe in return (the transaction) is not. In our view then
corruption can be defined as any unauthorized transaction between agents
and a third party. This third party acts as a second principal to the corrupt
agent, in which respect we differ from Klitgaard, who thinks of the third party
as a client to the agent.35
Which transactions are permitted and which are not is for the first principal
to decide, on moral grounds. This first principal can be an elected politician or
an appointed official, in which case it is a matter of bureaucratic corruption.
Political corruption refers to the situation in which the electorate acts as a
principal to a politician-agent.
Below we will turn our basic principal-agent model into a principals-agent
model of corruption.
A principals-agent model of corruption
 What does the possibility of corruption mean to P, A?
 Who will we label C?
Let us concentrate on newcomer C first. C faces two different problems. First
of all he has to consider whether corruption in itself pays or not. The benefits
of corruption for C consist of the service rendered or the good provided by
A, and/or not having to bear any deadweight costs. Against these benefits,
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there are the costs associated with corruption, such as the costs of finding a
corrupt agent, of negotiating the size of the bribe, and of course of the bribe
itself. Besides that, there are the costs of keeping the transaction secret, the
expected value of the penalty in case C gets caught, and moral costs.
Supposing that a decision is made in favour of corruption, C is confronted
with a second problem: he becomes a principal to A.
Suppose C, facing the possibility of a long wait at a customs post, bribes
a customs officer in order to get a swift passage through.36 Just as in the
previous section, there are four different possibilities:
1. C is promptly allowed to pass, partly as a result of A’s action in return
for C’s bribe. This is the only possibility that would fully please C.
2. C is promptly allowed to pass, although A merely collects the bribe and
does nothing to C’s advantage.
3. C has to wait like everyone else, despite A’s efforts.
4. C has to wait like everyone else, with A just pocketing the bribe.
Assume that C cannot costlessly monitor A’s actions, and that these actions
affect but do not determine the outcomes. What steps can we expect C to
take? If we are dealing with one-off corruption, and C is allowed a swift
passage through, he will probably congratulate himself on his foresight. If he
has to wait, he will look upon the ineffectual bribe as a one-time item of loss.
If we are dealing with recurrent corruption, however, the monitoring and
controlling activities that are part of the basic principal-agent model enter the
picture. Suppose C is confronted with a constant wait, despite his bribes. C is
not in a position to issue directives that narrow the set of alternative actions
A can choose from, so he has to rely on either changing the characteristics of
the alternative actions themselves (through incentives), or changing the way
the agent assesses these alternative actions (by persuasion). The use of these
instruments requires monitoring by C. His inspection and prevention costs
(I
C
and P
C
) are to be traded-off against his failure costs (F
C
). These failure
costs are either the costs of a non-preferred outcome (a wait) or the cost of
a redundant bribe. Of course, C’s decisions are linked. His total costs as a
principal will be part of his deliberations about engaging in, and proceeding
with, corruption. C’s costs and benefits are stated in Table 1.
Second, let us turn to the corrupt agent, A. He faces three different problems.
First, there is his principal-agent relation with P, and the minimisation of
C
A P
, D
A P
and F
A P
.
37 In the second place, there is his second principal
C. In this second principal-agent relation A will use the same concealment
and diversion tactics as in the first, and he will be concerned with a similar
minimisation of his total costs as agent (C
A C
, D
A C
and F
A C
). Third,
there is the decision to be corrupt or not. The costs associated with corruption
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Table 1. Costs and benefits for the corrupting principal.
Costs Benefits
Searching costs Service rendered/good provided by A
Negotiating costs Prevention of deadweight costs
Bribe
Covering-up costs
Penalty  probability of getting caught
Moral costs
Costs as a principal vis-a`-vis A
Inspection costs
Prevention costs:
 costs of incentives
 costs of persuasion
Failure costs
Table 2. Costs and benefits for the corrupt agent (A).
Costs Benefits
Costs as an agent vis-a`-vis P
Concealment costs
Diversion costs
Failure costs
Costs of corruption Benefits of corruption
Searching costs Bribe
Negotiating costs
Covering-up costs
Penalty probability of getting caught
Moral costs
Costs as an agent vis-a`-vis C
Concealment costs
Diversion costs
Failure costs
for A are searching costs, negotiating costs, covering-up costs, the expected
value of the penalty should he get caught, and moral costs, which must be
offset by the bribe. Just as with C, the last two decisions of A are interwoven.
Furthermore, A can expect some economies of scale to arise, especially with
respect to his concealment efforts. Table 2 shows the cost and benefits for A.
How about P? First of all, P still has to minimise his costs as a principal
in his principal-agent relationship with A. These costs are affected by the
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Figure 2. Costs of suppressing corruption, and failure costs.
corruption of A and C. First, there are externalities stemming from the use
of incentives and persuasion by C. If P and C prefer the same outcome
these externalities are positive, otherwise negative. Second, the activities
of A to cover-up the corruption, as well as similar activities vis-a`-vis his
second principal C, render P’s inspection and prevention less effective, and
increase his failure costs. Besides these effects of the corruption on his costs
as principal, there are possible direct effects.
First, there is a possibility that the corruption involves some kind of theft by
A. Shleifer and Vishny distinguish corruption without theft from corruption
with theft.38 In a situation of corruption without theft the agent turns over
the official price of the good or service (assuming the goods/services are
priced) to his principal, and keeps the bribe. In a situation of corruption with
theft, the sale as such is hidden, and the official price as well as the bribe
is pocketed by the agent. In the latter case corruption is, according to our
definition, combined with fraud by the agent.
Second, consider the case of corruption in awarding public-works contracts.
It is not unlikely that C, after he has won the contract, passes the costs of
corruption (notably the costs of the bribe) on to P, either by simply increasing
the price P has to pay, or by doing substandard work.
Suppose that P and C have matching preferences for a certain outcome, that
there is corruption without theft, and that C does not pass his costs on to P.
Would corruption in that case not be a blessing in disguise for P? No, because
in defining corruption as an unauthorized transaction we have assumed that
P will have objections to corruption on moral grounds. These moral costs
should work as an incentive to start monitoring for corruption, and to take
measures to prevent corruption taking place. What we have here, is a second
cost-minimisation problem for P. His moral costs (failure costs) can be forced
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Table 3. Costs and benefits for the first principal (P).
Costs Benefits
Costs as a principal vis-a`-vis A
Inspection costs
Prevention costs
 costs of incentives
 costs of persuasion
 costs of directives
Failure costs
Costs as a result of A’s and C’s corruption Benefits as a result of A’s corruption
Negative externalities from C’s prevention Positive externalities from C’s prevention
(if P’s and C’s preferences do not match) (if P’s and C’s preferences match)
Increased failure costs
Costs of monitoring and preventing corruption Possible yield of penalties
Failure costs (moral costs) with respect to
corruption
back if he engages in suppressing corruption, but he cannot do so costlessly.
Figure 2 depicts P’s optimal amount of corruption-suppressing effort. Table 3
shows the costs and benefits for P.
Political corruption in representative democracies
In this section we apply our principals-agent model to political corruption.
First, however, the validity of the assumptions of the basic principal-agent
model has to be assessed. After all, if these assumptions are too far-fetched
in the context of political corruption, it would not make any sense to continue
our endeavour. The same goes for our assumptions concerning corruption.
Without doubt, the relationship between voters and politicians in a repre-
sentative democracy can be considered to be a principal-agent relationship.39
Voters want politicians to look after their interests, and in exchange provide
these politicians with their votes and thus with positions. Of course, politi-
cians have their own interests, which may diverge from the voters’ interests.
At the heart of the agency problem, as formulated in section two, lie the
assumptions of costly monitoring and of the “weak” connection between the
agent’s action and the outcomes. Both assumptions are realistic in the context
of representative democracy: voters cannot costlessly monitor the actions of
politicians, and policy outcomes are hardly ever an unambiguous result of
these efforts.
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However, the large number of principals-voters in most representative
democracies may be problematic. Voters cannot costlessly monitor politi-
cians, but what is more, for the average voter it does not pay to invest a lot
of resources in the costly gathering of information (Downs’ “rational igno-
rance”). Yet this does not hold for the electorate as a whole. Collusion can be
profitable, if it can overcome free-rider problems resulting from externalities.
In this section we will treat the electorate as one principal, and we will add
“collusion costs” to that principal’s statement of costs.
Earlier, we defined corruption as any transaction between an agent and a
second principal that is unauthorized by the first principal. We argued that
neither the nature of the bribe nor the nature of the favour in return mattered.
The dividing lines between regular financial support of a favourite candidate,
pork-barrel politics, rent-seeking and corruption can be thin however, to the
analyst as well as to the politician.40 Corruption can well be seen as an illegal
form of rent-seeking.41 Yet where corruption starts and rent-seeking ends is
for the principal (i.e. the electorate) to decide.
From the previous section it follows that political corruption is concerned
with three (archetypal) individuals, facing seven different but intertwined
decisions:
1. the general agency problem for the electorate;
2. the general agency problem for politicians;
3. the corruption problem for politicians;
4. the corruption problem for the corrupting principals;
5. the agency problem for the corrupting principals;
6. the agency problem for the politicians vis-a`-vis the corrupting principals;
7. the corruption problem for the electorate.
A comprehensive application of our model to political corruption would show
how all these different and correlated costs and benefits are affected by:
– characteristics of the goods/services produced;
– characteristics of the production processes, including the electoral
systems;
– characteristics of the individuals involved.
Unfortunately, such a comprehensive application is beyond the scope of this
article. Below we will focus on some of the characteristics.
Private and public goods
Pure public goods are 100% externalities. It is extremely unlikely that a
corrupting principal would invest a bribe in a good/service, without being
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able to exclude others from the benefits of that good/service. Thus, the extent
to which government goods/services have externalities negatively affects the
incidence of corruption, due to the spread of benefits of corruption, or the
collusion costs corrupting principals have to bear to prevent that spread. It
must be noted, however, that the production of a public good is a private good.
Defence is a public good, which is not likely to be the subject of corruption;
defence orders are private goods, and can well be the subject of corruption.
Basu’s principle of efficient pricing
An important factor in the decision of C to turn to corruption are the dead-
weight costs associated with the goods/services. In some instances, like the
customs example in the previous section, corruption is concerned only with a
reduction of deadweight costs. Goods/services that are not adequately priced,
including cases where private goods are not priced at all, but are financed
out of taxes, are prone to corruption. This is known as Basu’s principle of
efficient pricing.42 If a good/service has a low price, or no price at all, and
high deadweight costs (for instance due to a rush), corruption may become a
viable option.
The implications of “deadweight costs”-bribery are not unambiguous. In
many instances bribery acts as a mechanism by which these deadweight costs
are redistributed, leaving the total deadweight costs unchanged. Lui offers
a queuing model of bribery in which the administrative process is sped up
by the corrupt officials who try to obtain as many bribes as possible.43 That
speed money is socially harmless, even helpful,44 is not true however. First,
the distribution of the “ability to bribe” is not equitable. Second, the relevant
“zero option” is the situation where the goods/services are efficiently priced
in the first place.
If corruption is rampant, it may become an alternative way of financing
government. Nye points out that when government lacks tax capacity, corrup-
tion may be an important source of capital formation.45 Shleifer and Vishny
show that corruption, because of its illegality and the need for secrecy, is more
distortionary and costly than its sister activity, taxation.46
Exit, voice and disloyalty
Alam distinguishes between different types of countervailing actions: evasive
countervailing actions, direct countervailing actions, and illicit countervailing
actions.47 Paraphrasing Hirschman, these three types of actions can be labelled
exit, voice and disloyalty. We will not go into the latter possibility, although
it can explain the rise of rampant corruption or, as Caiden and Caiden have
labelled it, systemic corruption.48
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The first type of action refers to entry and exit decisions by those who
are confronted with corruption. In our model of corruption this possibility
has not been fully appreciated. Each individual faces different entry and exit
decisions. The entry decisions of corrupt agents and principals are part of
our model, as are the costs and benefits of a longer lasting principal-agent
relationship, but the exit decision is absent in our model, as is the possibility
for the first principal to end his principal-agent relationship with a corrupt
agent.
Alam suggests that an individual who is confronted with corruption may
relocate, seek out officials who are not corrupt, find substitutes or private
alternatives to provision by corrupt officials, or forego such goods and services
altogether.49 In other words the individual may look for a substitute product,
or forego the product; or he may look for a substitute producer or forego
the producer. The first possibility (substituting or foregoing the product) is
subject to “asset specificity”. If the goods/services are custom-made for the
corrupt principal, or the bribe is tailored to the agent’s wishes, exit becomes
less likely. The goods/services and the bribe are too valuable. The second
possibility refers to the degree of competition: the degree of competition in the
“corruption-market”, and the degree of electoral competition (i.e. the degree
of competition in the basic principal-agent relationship).
Let us focus on electoral competition. Discontent on the part of the elec-
torate can be due to non-cooperative behaviour by politicians in general, but
can also be the result of corrupt behaviour. Whether corrupt politicians are
found out or not, depends on the monitoring and prevention activities of the
electorate on the one hand, and the effectiveness of the concealment and
diversion activities of corrupt politicians on the other. If corrupt politicians
are found out, full electoral competition in principle counters corruption, in
that they are not re-elected. Even with full competition and a well informed
electorate however, corruption may occur. Because of the strongly dimin-
ished probability of re-election, the bribes corrupt politicians are offered just
have to be larger.50 As mentioned in the introduction to this article, there has
been some discussion concerning the actual degree of competition in different
electoral systems. What is important from the perspective of our model is that
competition increases the searching costs and negotiating costs for corrupting
principals, as well as for corrupt agents.
In short, electoral competition can counter corruption with retroactive effect
(by throwing the rascals out), but what is more important is that it increases
the minimum magnitude of the bribes as well as the transaction costs for those
contemplating corruption.
226 NICO GROENENDIJK
Della Porta’s ‘Business Politicians’
Finally, let us turn to the characteristics of those who are involved in corrup-
tion, particularly the corrupt agents. Della Porta depicts the Italian political
class that now appears to have been swept away by the Tangentopoli investi-
gations as consisting of business politicians.51 The emergence of this political
class interacted with the spread of corruption. She shows that members of
this class had very little sense of civic morality. They viewed politics as just
another business. In terms of our model, these business politicians therefore
may differ from their principals as far as the perception of corruption is con-
cerned. What is viewed as an impermissible transaction by the electorate, may
be viewed as standard business practice by business politicians. The moral
costs of corruption for these business politicians will be very low. Political
parties can even become agencies of socialization in illegality.52
What is also striking in Della Porta’s description is the complexity of cor-
ruption as such. The searching and negotiating procedures are obscure, which
means that the searching and negotiating costs for newcomers are relatively
high, and relatively low for those already in business. The concealment and
diversion activities of the politician-agent vis-a`-vis the corrupting principal
are eye-catching: ranging from arbitrary actions to outbursts of rage. On the
other hand, business politicians are keen to be perceived as “honest” in their
relationship with corrupting principals.
Although we did not apply our model at length, we can conclude this section
by observing that contrary to Johnston’s suggestion the use of principal-agent
models of corruption need not be limited to bureaucratic corruption.53
Conclusion
This article has dealt with trade-off costs. Principals have to bear failure
costs and inspection/prevention costs, and have to minimise the sum of these
costs, hindered by the agent’s concealment and diversion activities. Moreover,
principals that are confronted with corruption have to minimise the sum of
the costs of suppressing corruption and failure costs.
We have observed that in the general agency problem, the principal will
eventually have to turn his mind to the cost-efficiency of his inspection and
prevention efforts, as well as to the fundamental problem of the indeterminacy
of outcomes. In this respect there are two important elements: the extent to
which the desired outcomes are concrete, and whether agents are part of a
team or not. From the point of view of suppressing corruption, teamwork is
to be preferred, but not from the general principal-agent perspective. Though
it may limit corruption, teamwork gives way to shirking. The same holds for
A PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL OF CORRUPTION 227
political corruption. In most democracies, Acton’s principle that power tends
to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely, has led to complicated
systems of checks and balances, which have contributed to the obfuscation
of party function and responsibility.54 Next to the two different trade-off-
problems mentioned above, then, there is a third: the trade-off between the
general agency problem and the problem of corruption. It is in this direction
that we point for further research.
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